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The “White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025” recently presented
by the Commission has already triggered discussion and received attention (and criticism).
It is evident from the subtitle of this document that the Commission does not consider the UK as one of the future
members of the EU, which is curious since Art. 50 TEU has not been activated yet. This is in line with a general
(and questionable) attitude shown by the supranational institutions on Brexit.
However, here I would like to share some thoughts on one of the options recalled by the White Paper and then
endorsed by France, Germany, Italy and Spain in a recent meeting, namely that of an asymmetric Europe. Being
myself a comparative lawyer I have nothing against asymmetry, which should be conceived as an instrument of
differentiated integration. At the same time, in order not to alter the integrative potential of this instrument it is
necessary to provide the system with constitutional safeguards. These caveats are crucial since they make the
asymmetry produced by enhanced cooperation sustainable under EU law, by impeding the violation of the
untouchable core of the EU. Sustainability here should be understood as “proven ability to hold together, to
sustain, mutually inconsistent sub-traditions” or, in other words, to “achieve complexity”.
The literature on differentiated integration and multi-speed Europe is huge, and this explains why the ideas of
differentiated integration and asymmetry have been extended and adapted to many different processes by
scholars over the years. In this sense, symmetry and asymmetry have been defined in the following terms:
“Federal symmetry refers to the uniformity among member states in the pattern of their relationships within a
federal system. ‘Asymmetry’ in a federal system, therefore, occurs where there is a differentiation in the degrees
of autonomy and power among the constituent units.”
While some comparative lawyers still treat asymmetry as an exception in the life of federal polities (and this can
be explained by conceiving the foedus as a contract between parties put on an equal footing), actually this
concept has progressively acquired a key role in the history of federalism. In other words, today asymmetry is
the rule rather than the exception in this field.
Asymmetry has been frequently experimented with within federalising processes, especially in those federal or
quasi-federal contexts characterised by the coexistence of different legal and cultural backgrounds (Canada, for
instance but also Belgium, India and Spain). One should take this into account before conceiving, for instance, of
enhanced cooperation as a form of “constitutional evil” conducive to a “disintegrative” multi-speed Europe.
On the contrary, asymmetry might even serve as an instrument of constitutional integration. For instance,
flexibility and asymmetry are two of the most important features of Canadian federalism, elements partly
explicable by taking into account the cultural and economic diversity present in the territory. In an important
contribution Bauböck recalls that: 1) asymmetry can affect cohesion, that is, “the glue binding the component
parts together”; 2) asymmetric powers can translate “unequal representation of citizens in federal government
and thus can be seen to violate a commitment to equal federal citizenship”; and 3) asymmetry may be perceived
as a threat to the quality of the democratic debate, making the polity less understandable to citizens and creating
“incentives for bargaining that will generate even more asymmetry.”
At the same time asymmetry is a resource for a polity that wants to recover disadvantaged minorities and that
respects the equal dignity of its components. In other words, asymmetry is a game between centripetal and
centrifugal forces, and here again one can find interesting clues from comparative studies. Indeed, the debate on
the possible negative implications of asymmetry leads to the identification of a constitutional core of principles
and values whose respect makes asymmetry “sustainable”: this is also the rationale of asymmetry in EU law for
instance, when dealing with Art. 326 TFEU.
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As comparative law shows, asymmetry works as a safety valve of some tensions generated by the coexistence
of different cultures.
This is crucial to conceive the flexibility ensured by asymmetry as an added value to the integration
phenomenon. Against this background, flexibility gives “something more” to the life of a political system only
when the identity of this system is preserved; otherwise, flexibility would lead to a revolution in a technical sense,
i.e. a transformation of the identity of the legal system. In order to avoid this, a legal system allowing asymmetry
presents some constitutional safeguards.
Scholars have conducted in-depth studies of the contours acquired by the idea of differentiation in EU law and its
main sources, distinguishing several models. Others have harshly criticised the asymmetric option, looking at it
as incompatible with an integration process. Finally, another group of authors has insisted on the positive
implications of a multi-speed Europe to overcome the difficulties present in the enlarged Union.
The EU already knows some forms of asymmetry; the opting-out mechanism, the open method of coordination,
and enhanced cooperation are just some examples. The new economic governance, in particular the adoption of
the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), gave
new lifeblood to the debate on asymmetry in the life of the Union.
The instrument of enhanced cooperation is particularly useful in understanding the important role played by
those constitutional safeguards aimed at making asymmetry sustainable and thus functional to the goals of
integration.
Enhanced cooperation aims to ensure, at the same time, unity and diversity. In fact, it allows Member States to
experiment with different forms of integration without “shutting the door” to those unwilling to take steps towards
deeper integration in specific areas (openness is at the heart of Art. 331 TFEU). Enhanced cooperation can be
conceived as a sort of extrema ratio to be exploited when the Council realises that the goals of integration cannot
be achieved within a reasonable period by the EU as a whole. The procedures to be followed in this case ensure
the intervention and control of the other EU institutions (Commission, Parliament) guaranteeing the common
agents’ control.
Enhanced cooperation under EU law also counter-balances (partly at least) Bauböck’s argument on the lack of
transparency of asymmetrical dynamics, since according to Art. 330 TFEU, “[a]ll members of the Council may
participate in its deliberations.” Finally, enhanced cooperation is conceived for specific areas, and this is “a
guarantee not only for those Member States without the political will to join enhanced cooperation from the
beginning, but also for those which do not meet the objective requirements for joining the enhanced cooperation
scheme.” As mentioned previously, the discipline of enhanced cooperation under the EU is emblematic of how
asymmetry can perform an integrative function. The governing provisions are Arts. 330-333 TFEU and Art. 20
TEU. As scholars pointed out, all these rules can be traced back to three groups of norms: those concerning the
activation (minimum number of Member States, role of the Commission, Parliament and Council), those
regarding the functioning of enhanced cooperation (regular use of the EU institutions, application of particular
rules for the working of the Council, use of the passerelle clause) and, finally, those governing the possibility to
join the cooperation for the “non-original parties.” More generally, when analysing these provisions it is possible
to infer limits and conditions – what Fabbrini calls both ex ante and ex post caveats – of enhanced cooperation
in EU law (for instance, exclusion of areas covered by the EU’s exclusive competence, the necessity to rely on it
as a last resort, compliance with the EU Treaties).
All these elements serve as constitutional safeguards since they make the asymmetry produced by enhanced
cooperation sustainable under EU law.
At the same time, sustainability is also guaranteed by norms like Art. 326 TFEU which clarifies that enhanced
cooperation “shall comply with the Treaties and Union law” and “shall not undermine the internal market or
economic, social and territorial cohesion. It shall not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between
Member States, nor shall it distort competition between them”. By so doing this provision identifies a list of
elements that can be traced back to that untouchable core we referred to.
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What can we learn from these technical points? In theory this reference to multi speed is not necessarily a bad
thing but, unfortunately, the White Paper does not say too much on how such an asymmetric option should be
activated and carried out. The EU Treaties already give a spectrum of possibilities, however, whatever this
reference means it will be necessary to handle asymmetry with care, either by following the existing rules or by
devising ad hoc safeguards to avoid transforming the EU into something else, into a different beast whose
contour is barely recognisable to those who care about Europe.
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